## From Gaps to Solutions:

# The Intergovernmental Dimension of Public Investment Management

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### **Outline**

- Motivation
- II. Understanding responsibilities: three layers
- III. Challenges
- IV. What explains inefficiencies?
- V. From gaps to solutions

I. MOTIVATION: THERE ARE WIDENING GAPS BUT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ADDRESSING THEM ARE ON DIFFERENT LEVELS

## Public Investment – its current salience Everybody talks about Infrastructure...

"We wish to use our oil revenues to invest in infrastructure which can benefit future generations"

Mrs Kiwanuka, Minister for Finance, Planning and Economic Development of Uganda

"What we need are viable, bankable and innovative projects which provide added value for investment and modernizing the economy"


Werner Hoyer, EIB, November 2014

"Time is right for an infrastructure push in countries where conditions are right"

IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2014


**Growing support for Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank** 

G-20 focus on infrastructure investment






# ....but few about which level of government is actually responsible and the consequences



## A look across the world Share of Subnational Investment Expenditures



Data: 2011. Source: GFS and World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators.

## Infrastructure Gaps around the World


	Avg GDP Growth (2000-2011) <sup>18</sup>	Urbanization Rate (2011)	Telecom Access (per 100 people) (2011) <sup>2</sup>	Electricity Access (% of pop.) (2009) <sup>9</sup>	Access to Improved Sanitation (% of pop.) (2010)*	Access to Improved Water (% of pop.) (2010) <sup>6</sup>
EAP	8.9	49	105	91	66	90
ECA	5.1	65	157	100	84	96
LAC	3.6	79	125	93	79	94
MNA	4.3	59	105	90	88	89
SAR	6.7	31	72	62	38	90
SSA	4.6	36	54	31	31	61
World	2.7	52	103	79	63	88

Source: Andres, Biller, and Herrera Dappe (2013).

## "Vertical" gaps: supply vs. demand

- **Developing countries:** spend about USD1 tril. a year on infrastructure, but an additional USD1 tril./yr is required through 2020.
- Asia and Pacific: ca. USD 180 billion annually (demand vs. supply; public and private; UN ESCAP 2006)
  - Multilateral financing only represents a small fraction (about 5 percent) of the gap
- Africa: USD 93 billion a year (about 15 percent of the region's GDP; Foster & Briceno-Garmendia)
  - Two-thirds: capital expenditure; One-third: operation and maintenance

Annual infrastructure spending requirements in the developing world (\$tr, 2008)



NOTES: \$ trillion per year, (2008 real prices), capital investments only (excl. operation and maintenance costs)
SOURCE: Estimated annual infrastructure spending need for 2020 calculated by taking the Fay et al (2010) estimate of \$1.25-1.5 trillion annually in 2013 and assuming a
4% annual growth rate from 2013-20, and an additional \$200-300 billion annual requirement to make the infrastructure sustainable (both mitigation and
adaptation); the split by region, sector, and phase are authors' own calculations taking ranges from Yepes (2008), MDB G20 working group on infrastructure
(2011), and Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010); note the \$200-300 billion annual requirement for sustainability is assumed split in the same ratio as the
other investments across regions, sectors and phases

## **Urban-rural dynamics**

### **Rural areas**

29.4% of rural population is poor

76% of the extreme poor live in rural areas


#### **Urban** areas

11.6% of urban population is poor


80% of Global GDP

3.6 Billion people in 2010


96% of the additional 1.4 billion people in developing countries between now and 2030 will live in urban areas



## "Horizontal gaps": Rural Access




## Regressivity of Infrastructure Access: Comparing India and Sri Lanka




## II. UNDERSTANDING RESPONSIBILITIES: THE THREE LAYERS

### A complex multi-actor process



# The intergovernmental dimension: three layers of responsibilities



## Organizational approaches at national and subnational levels


- Sector agency
- Center of government: Ministries of Finance/Planning
- Community management


### III. CHALLENGES




Source: Based on data from World Economic Forum (2006 and 2010) and IMF-WEO (2002-2010).

### **Cost and time overruns**








Source: WB estimates

# Fragmentation combined with limited checks and balances Example of Peru


### Number of viable projects (pre-investment)



Green: municipalities

Red: regional governments Blue: national government


#### Rate of rejected and viable projects



Source: Frank and Garcia-Garcia, 2012, based on MEF-SIAF, SNIP

## **Absorption capacity**


### Example of Peru



Source: Frank and Garcia-Garcia, 2012, based on MEF-SIAF

### **Equity**

Peru: Horizontal Inequities in Subnational Investment Spending (S/. per capita), 2009



Departments: from «rich» to «poor»


Source: Frank and Guerra-Garcia 2013, based on MEF (SIAF), INEI.

# IV. WHAT EXPLAINS INEFFICIENCIES? A LOOK AT SOME OF THE DRIVERS AND INCENTIVE PROBLEMS

# Optimism bias: differences in amounts between planned and approved budgets

Cajamarca case - Peru





Blue: planned budget (pre-investment stage); Red: evaluated projects; Green: approved budget; Purple: approved budget


Source: Cajamarca Regional Government

## Volatility in funding – multiple root causes

- Public investment as fiscal adjustment variable:
  - Upwards, downwards
  - Fiscal stimulus plans post-2008/9 crisis
- Co-financing
- Competitive allocation
- Transfers to SNG: different level of risk sharing among levels
- Natural resources
- Differing preferences

# Dilemmas of un-bundling: Operation and maintenance

- Some O+M is invisible: not always local advantage
- Optimism bias favor new works over O+M
- Incentives for O+M if infrastructure not in line with local interests?
- Technical capacities
- Cross-subsidies for O+M? –
   Exception: user fee financed



Picture: A. Zamalloa

### "I think they just ate the funds. Do you see a school here?"

A man from Likoni, a poverty ridden area on the outskirts of Mombasa, Kenya Source: Open Budget Survey 2012

### **Vulnerability to Corruption – Selected Sectors**

Water and Sanitation	Land acquisition, selection of contractors, bid rigging, compromising quality, bribes for connections, meter tampering, conflict of interest with officials involved in private provision, collusion with companies offering bottled water or tanker provision
Roads	Land acquisition, rehabilitation, selection of contractors, false procurement and maintenance expenditures, quality of construction
Electricity	<u>Public utilities:</u> Land acquisition, rights of way, rehabilitation, equipment purchase and repair mark ups, patronage appointments, defective meters, meter tampering, theft of electricity by tapping distribution lines with side payments, connections delays, false billing, response to non-payment of bills, false subsidy payments <u>Private utilities:</u> Selection, regulatory regime, price hikes, blind eye to capital deterioration
Hospitals	Ghost hospitals, false procurement and construction
Schools	Ghost school, false procurement and corruption

Source: Shah 2015, forthcoming

## V. FROM GAPS TO SOLUTIONS: SELECTING ENTRY POINTS

# Principles of decentralization: important additions

- Assymetry 

  tailored to gaps
  - Metro/Urban vs. Rural SNG

Flexibility 

tailored to sectors and projects

- Gradualism → quick gain
  - Choose sectors
  - Steps: procurement

# Where to start: Preparation, implementation, or ex-post evaluation?

**Project preparation** 

**Project** implementation

**Ex-post evaluation** 

Stronger capacity could help stop unjustified projects

Easier to attract new resources with pre-appraised projects.

Most spending often on ongoing projects.


Quick wins from improved implementation

Holding politicians accountable

Feed lessons learned into project cycle



## **Gate keeping**



## Set incentives for whole investment cycle ... but there are trade-offs: strengthen appraisal or implementation first?

		Strengthen	
		implementation	
		Well	Poorly
		executed	executed
	"Good"	A <	C
Strengthen	projects	<b>^</b>	
appraisal	"Poor"	B	D
	projects		

### Fiscal incentives

- Subnational tax sets desirable incentives (Viñuela 2015)
- Co-financing schemes:
  - Signalling of priorities
  - Reveals demand of SNG
  - Technical Assistance
- Maintenance grant
- Earmarking: once responsibilities are consolidating

### **Enhancing equity**

- Social services (hospitals, schools):
  - Incorporate into recurrent equalization grants (large operation and maintenance costs)

- Fee recoverable infrastructure (utilities):
  - Credit facilitation + fiscal responsibility
- Non-fee recoverable infrastructure (no-toll roads):
  - Conditional grant

# Procurement: example for intergovernmental capacities

### Differentiate responsibilities:

- Central: complex, tailor-made projects (irrigation; hydraulic structures; solar energy; etc)
- Local: modular projects (school buildings; etc)

### Approaches:

- By size of SNG
- By financial cost
- By sector
- By type of project


# Towards further integration of financial management and information systems

Country	Interface IFMIS vs SNIP	Single project code in IFMIS	
Brazil	yes	yes	
Colombia	yes	yes	
Chile	yes	yes	
Costa Rica	no	no	
Guatemala	no	no	
Honduras	yes	yes (social investments)	
Paraguay	no	yes (in execution stage but not	
		at pre-investment level)	
Perú	no	yes	
Bolivia	no	yes	
Uruguay	no	yes	

Source: IDB Survey 2009-2010 and World Bank

### Strengthen the demand side

- Interactive tools open to citizens and users
- Geo-referencing
- Expenditure tracking
- Benchmarking
- Ex-post evaluation








## Quick-gain strategy can prove effective - but do not lose sight of overall coherence

Quick-gains strategy in Mexico: focus on high expenditure areas



Fuente: Subsecretaría de Egresos de la SHCP/Tomo VII PEF 2009 / Análisis Deloitte

### Investing into the Invisible: Coordination

- Not a substitute for proper definition of responsibilities
- Signaling Conditionalities Contracting
- Approaches:
  - Vertical and horizontal
  - Sector and territories
- Fitting the intergovernmental context

### Main messages

- SNGs play a fundamental and increasing role in provision of infrastructure
- Needs systemic view, but focus on the «good enough»
- Place- and context-specific approach
- Future drivers:
  - Better informed and more demanding citizens
  - Politicians' renewed interest in planning and budget goals

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Decentralization and Infrastructure: From Gaps to Solutions

Jonas Frank Jorge Martinez-Vazquez



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